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Abstract
This article aims to develop a new account of scientific explanation for
computer simulations. To this end, two questions are answered: what
is the explanatory relation for computer simulations? and what kind of
epistemic gain should be expected? For several reasons tailored to the
benefits and needs of computer simulations, these questions are bet-
ter answered within the unificationist model of scientific explanation.
Unlike previous efforts in the literature, I submit that the explanatory
relation is between the simulation model and the results of the simula-
tion. I also argue that our epistemic gain goes beyond the unificationist
account, encompassing a practical dimension as well.
1 Introduction
It is often claimed that computer simulations provide genuine instances of
scientific understanding. These claims take note of the capacity of computer
simulations to extend or enhance our access to the (empirical) world that
is otherwise unreachable. Recent philosophical debates make use of notions
like ‘explanation,’ ‘prediction,’ and ‘confirmation’ to illustrate precisely how
computer simulations ground such understanding. Unfortunately, such no-
tions are typically embedded within larger philosophical discussions and are
never addressed in detail. Take for instance scientific explanation, the chief
notion of this article. In his discussion on how computer simulations pro-
duce new knowledge, Beisbart states: “It is arguable that some scientific
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computer simulations provide explanations. If computer simulations are
arguments and if explanations are arguments (or are at least built upon
arguments), it is obvious how computer simulations can figure in explana-
tion.” [4, 429]. El Skaf and Imbert [9] are another good example of how
philosophers acknowledge explanation as an important epistemic feature of
computer simulations, although they embed the notion in the discussion
of thought experiments and scientific experimentation. To these authors
“[e]xperiments, computer simulations and thought experiments (hereafter
E, CS and TE) are traditionally assigned different roles in scientific activity.
For example, TE are often seen as ways of exploring conceptual apparatus
and developing theorizing (Kuhn 1964), and CS as ways of providing theo-
retical explanations or making predictions, which E hardly contribute to.”
[9, 3452].
In this article, I propose to look squarely at the logic of scientific explana-
tion for computer simulations. To this end, I expand the explanatory base of
the unificationist approach and accommodate computer simulations within
its framework. I then focus on answering two questions, namely: ‘what is the
explanatory relation for computer simulations?’ and ‘what kind of epistemic
gain should we expect?’. Along with these questions, several philosophical
issues relating to scientific explanation and computer simulations emerge
and are discussed.
The discussion is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature
on scientific explanation and computer simulations, as well as establishes
the aims of this article. A chief result of this section is that my approach
departs from earlier attempts in the literature, both in terms of the explana-
tory relation as well as in the treatment of the epistemic gain. Section 3
elaborates on an example of a computer simulation of an orbiting satellite
under tidal stress. Admittedly, the example is rather simple, but it helps
to introduce the basic terminology and makes the analysis of explanation a
manageable task. The treatment of more complex computer simulations are
discussed in section 5. Section 4 addresses the logic of scientific explanation
for computer simulations at face value. It begins by arguing in favor of
the unificationist account of scientific explanation as a suitable theoretical
framework for computer simulations. Section 4.1 presents the unificationist
account as elaborated by Kitcher ([18], [19]) and how computer simulations
are accommodated within this framework. Section 4.2 fleshes out the form
that an explanatory relation has for computer simulations using the example
discussed in section 3. Finally, section 4.3 contains a discussion of the kind
of epistemic gain obtained by explaining with computer simulation.
2
2 Computer simulations and scientific explanation
Recent efforts towards unveiling the logic of scientific explanation for com-
puter simulations can be found in the work of [31] and [20]. Both authors
defend a similar view on the issue. First, that the mathematical models
implemented as the computer simulation have explanatory force (i.e., the
mathematical model is identified as the explanans). Second, that explana-
tion is of a real-world phenomenon (i.e., real-world phenomenon is identified
as the explanandum). Thus understood, Weirich and Krohs subscribe to
the standard view on scientific explanation rather than giving to computer
simulations a role in the explanatory relation. One could then ask which
is the explanatory role played by computer simulations? The answer is, for
both authors, the same: a computer simulation plays the instrumental role
of computing the set of solutions for the mathematical model.
In the following, I discuss each author’s position individually and show
that both wrongly take the explanans to be a mathematical model and
the explanandum to be a real-world phenomenon. I then argue that the
explanans must be identified with the simulation model – that is, the model
at the basis of the computer simulation which takes from, but cannot be
identified with, a mathematical model – and that the explanandum must be
identified with the results of the computer simulation.
Let us begin with Weirich, who believes that computer simulations exem-
plify the dynamics of mathematical models that represent a phenomenon un-
der investigation. That is to say, computer simulations implement and com-
pute the structural properties of mathematical models in a rather straight-
forward way [31, 156]. In this respect, there is little difference between one
and the other, except for the fact that computer simulations facilitate solv-
ing the set of equations in the mathematical models. Weirich illustrates this
point in the following way: “A simulation [...] uses a dynamic model of a
natural system that produces the phenomenon. It uses the model to imitate
the natural system’s production of the phenomenon” [31, 156]. Thus under-
stood, Weirich has good motivations for identifying the dynamic model as
the explanans since it holds the right structures that describe the real-world
phenomenon. Furthermore, since computer simulations perform only the
instrumental role of computing the dynamic model, it is difficult to argue
for them having any explanatory force.
As for the explanandum, we need to look at the interpretation of ‘pro-
ducing the phenomenon’ in the previous quotation. Weirich understands
this notion as referring to the set of results of the computer simulation that
robustly represent real-world phenomena [31, 158]. This is an important
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point that underscores two issues and that I later use to ground my claim
that explanation is actually of the results of the simulation: first, that our
access to the world using computer simulations is mediated by the results
of the simulation; and second, that such results need to be verified and
validated in order to count as representing real-world phenomena. Unfortu-
nately, Weirich takes these ideas too far, conflating robust results with the
actual real-world phenomena. That is to say, the results of computer simu-
lations are a conceptual ‘bridge’ that connects to the real-world phenomena
to be explained. In and by themselves, the results have little value other
than as a link to the real-world. Thus understood, it is not surprising that
the author prefers a familiar explanandum, that is, to explain the actual
real-world phenomena. He makes this point plain in the following way: “I
examine only simulations that a model guides, in particular, simulations in
which the guiding model aims to explain a natural phenomenon” [31, 156].
As argued, Weirich has no motivations to modify the standard explana-
tory schemata of a model explaining real-world phenomena. To his mind, the
use of computer simulation is only justified for finding the set of solutions
of the dynamic model, and the results are so robust that they altogether
represent the real-world phenomena. Weirich condenses some of these ideas:
“[f]or the simulation to be explanatory, the model has to be explanatory” [31,
Abstract]. The example chosen also illustrates his viewpoint: “a computer
simulation of an economic market explains the emergence of an efficient allo-
cation of goods if the model it follows does” [31, 156]. As I discuss later, my
account significantly differs from Weirich both in the methodology and the
epistemology of computer simulations, as well as the representational role of
results of computer simulations. If I am correct, then computer simulations
do have explanatory force and there is a way to show it.
Krohs shares with Weirich the general picture of scientific explanation
for computer simulations. However, he has a different stand on the method-
ology and epistemology of computer simulations, as well as the way results
represent. First, Krohs agrees with Weirich that computer simulations only
provide numerical solutions to mathematical models that represent real-wold
phenomena [20, 278]. In fact, he explicitly adopts Hartmann’s viewpoint by
stating that the primary element of interest in computer simulations is the
theoretical model whose set of solutions are to be found [20, 278].1 However,
he has a different viewpoint regarding the relation between theoretical mod-
els and computer simulations.2 To his mind, a theoretical model suffers a
1Hartmann famously argued that computer simulations are methods for solving in the
computer the set of the equations of dynamic models [15, 83].
2To Krohs, ‘theoretical models’ are mathematical models that describe a given empir-
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series of modifications, falsifications, and distortions before any implementa-
tion on the computer is possible. Such modifications, Krohs argues, prevent
us from claiming that the theoretical model and the computer simulation
share the same structures. In Krohs’ own words, “[...] the model that con-
stitutes the basis of the simulation is not identical to the theoretical model.
The simulation does not strictly rely on the mechanism described by the
theoretical model. It refers to an ad hoc modified mechanism, which is not
supposed to occur in the real-world system.”3 [20, 282]. Thus understood,
Krohs has good reasons to identify the explanans with the theoretical model,
as well as to block the simulation model for playing any explanatory role. It
is the theoretical model, and not the simulation model, that holds the right
set of structures for explanatory purposes. Furthermore, the ad hoc modi-
fications reflect the unreliable source of information that is the simulation
model [20, 280]. To dispel all doubts about his position, Krohs says “the
simulation model does not provide an acceptable explanation of the material
system” [20, 282].
From here it follows that the results of the simulation must forcefully vary
from those expected from the theoretical model, even if in small amounts,
and thus can never describe the mechanisms in the real-world phenomenon
[20, 281]. Krohs puts this idea in the following way: “results [of a computer
simulation] deviate from those to be expected from the theoretical model by
the sum of discretization and numerical errors” [20, 282]. At best, Krohs
says, also following Hartmann, results of the simulation ‘imitate’ within
certain acceptable degree the behavior of a real-world phenomenon [20, 283].
Thus understood, results of computer simulations cannot be an appropriate
constituent in an explanatory relation that tries to account for an empirical
system. Rather, the real-world phenomenon itself must then be identified
with the explanandum.
It is interesting to note that, unlike Weirich who virtually neglects the
role of computer simulations in the explanatory relation, Krohs suggests he
has found a place for them. He asserts that “in the triangle of real-world
process, theoretical model, and simulation, explanation of the real-world
process by simulation involves a detour via the theoretical model” [20, 284].
Now, such a claim seems to be at odds with Krohs’ previous position on the
(small) role of computer simulations in the explanatory relation. In fact, it
begs the question of how such a detour is possible at all, and what does it
ical target system [20, 278].
3Let it be noticed that Krohs refers to structures and mechanisms indistinguishably.
This is so because he frames computer simulations within the mechanicistic theory [20,
282].
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mean for explanatory purposes. Unfortunately Krohs neither provides an
answer to these issues nor makes explicit the explanatory role of computer
simulations. Instead, computer simulations play an instrumental role (i.e.,
made visible in the notion of simulacra [20, 285]), and explanation is a
relation between a theoretical model and real-world phenomena.
To my mind, neither Weirich nor Krohs fully capture the explanatory
power of computer simulations. As mentioned, to these authors explanation
takes the standard format of a mathematical model explaining real-world
phenomena. Strictly speaking, computer simulations do not play any role
in the explanatory relation, but only in solving the mathematical model
as a means to relate with real-world phenomena. Such a stand is possible
because there is a fundamental misunderstanding on the epistemological role
of computer simulations, as well as the way in which researchers access a
world mediated by their results. In this respect, my proposal differs from
Weirich and Krohs on two accounts. On the one hand, I take the simulation
model – and not an exogenous mathematical model – to be the explanans
in the explanatory relation; on the other, I take the results of computer
simulations to be the explanandum. Let me now make these points more
clear.
Much has been said about the role that computer simulations occupy
in scientific research. Many philosophers have claimed that computer sim-
ulations implement a mathematical model simpliciter, and thus their use is
justified when analytic methods are unavailable (e.g., [15], [16], [14], and
[27], among others). This viewpoint grants computer simulations only a
secondary epistemological value and thus the theoretical model must be pre-
ferred when possible. Weirich quite straightforwardly adopts this viewpoint,
and so does Krohs by the longer road of claiming for ad hoc modifications
in the simulation model.
A closer view on the practice and methodology of computer simulation
shows otherwise. Standard computer simulations involve the transforma-
tion of a manifold of mathematical models for their implementation as a
simulation model. Such transformations are not merely formal (e.g., requir-
ing discretization methods), but involve a series of contrivances as well. A
simple example is illustrated in Figure 1, where the mass of the satellite is
no longer treated as one, but rather divided into three masses connected by
springs. Techniques of simplifying assumptions, removing degrees of free-
dom, and even substituting simple empirical relationships for more complex
ones is an ubiquitous practice across computer simulations that Winsberg
calls ‘ad hoc modeling’ [32, 282]. Similar claims can also be founded in the
work of [17], [25], [33] and, more recently, [?]. Following these authors, I
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show in section 3 that none of these transformations entail downplaying the
epistemological value of computer simulations.
Another important issue overlooked by both Weirich and Krohs is that
the significance of computer simulations comes primarily from providing in-
formation about a target system that is not available beforehand. Such
information comes in two different ways. Either results represent real-world
phenomena, in which case our access to the latter comes via the former, or
the results do not have an empirical counterpart in the world, in which case
the results are, in fact, all the information available. A vivid example of the
first case are simulations that scale down time and space such as computer
simulations on the evolution of life on Earth. Our information about the
evolution of a system is first – and, in this case, only – accessible via the
results of a computer simulation. An example of the second case is a simula-
tion where the gravitational constant is set to G = 2m3kg−1s−2. To the best
of our current scientific knowledge, no physical systems exist with such a
value for the gravitational constant. The results of the simulation, whatever
they might be, are nomologically impossible since they violate a physical
constant. Either way, scientific practice involved with computer simulation
is concerned with the use of results as their primary – and sometimes only
– source of information.
A chief philosophical problem here stems from finding ways to epistemi-
cally ground the results of the simulation as reliably representing real-world
phenomena. This is the object of much dispute among philosophers. Au-
thors like [23, 24], [25], and [27] have this issue in the background of their
discussions on the epistemological power of computer simulations (for a dis-
cussion on this issue, see [8]). And several authors have tried to ground
representation by looking at verification and validation methods (e.g., [26],
[21], and [22]). More recently [6] has expanded his inferential conception to
include computer simulations as inferential devices that represent empirical
phenomena.
It is standard for philosophers to take representation as a matter of
degrees and of encompassing the totality of the results of the simulation.
While the former point is correct, the latter is not always so. The overlooked
issue is that the results of computer simulations do not always altogether
represent what they show. To illustrate this point, consider the visualization
of Figure 2. On the one hand, the spikes represent, to some acceptable
degree, the behavior that a real-world satellite would produce due to tidal
stress. On the other, we see a steady downward trend that is the product of
a roundoff error coded in the simulation model. If the entire set of results are
taken to represent real-world phenomena, as Weirich and Krohs have, then
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we are wrongly ascribing a trend towards a circular orbit to the behavior of
the real-world satellite, when in fact it is an artifact in the computation of
the simulation model.
These considerations give us a purchase for identifying the explanans and
the explanandum in the explanatory relation. I take the explanandum to be
the results of the computer simulation for two reasons. First, because the use
of computer simulations entails that our information about the target system
comes first – and sometimes only – through the results of the simulation.
In fact, this is to many the main reason for using computer simulations in
the first place. A logic of scientific explanation for computer simulations
must reflect this fact. That is, that explanation is first of the results of the
simulation and later of the real-world phenomenon. Second, because directly
explaining real-world phenomena, as Weirich and Krohs suggest, requires
the results to represent altogether the real-world phenomena. As shown
before, results of computer simulations carry with them artifacts coded in
the simulation model that cannot be ascribed to real-world phenomena and
thus are not constitutive for their explanation. Ignoring these issues not
only begs the question of the role of computer simulation in the explanatory
relation, but also of which phenomenon is actually being explained (i.e.,
Weirich and Krohs have lost the ability to distinguish numerical artifacts
from correct representation). As I show in the remaining sections, there is
a way to explain the spikes and the steady trend separately.
This last point has some kinship with the reasons for taking the ex-
planans to be the simulation model. It is the simulation model – and not an
exogenous mathematical model – the unit with the most explanatory rele-
vance for the results of the simulation. Although mathematical models play
a significant role at the early stages of designing and coding the simulation
model, these include and exclude structures which are not present in the
mathematical model but that have explanatory force. Take again Figure
2. As I show by the end of section 3, the mathematical model is unable
to account for the spikes trending steadily downwards. Similarly, an expla-
nation of the length of the spikes depends, inter alia, on the length of the
spring that make the representation of the satellite in the simulation model
in Figure 1 – instead, the satellite in the mathematical model is represented
by a point.
By interpreting the explanans and the explanandum in this way, I believe
we can make full sense of the logic of scientific explanation for computer
simulations. Following Weirich and Krohs, my project also aims to account
for real-world phenomena. I deviate from them, however, in that I fully
include computer simulations as a component in the explanatory relation.
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Let me now discuss in more detail the form that such an explanation would
take. I begin by presenting a simple example.
3 Background terminology and an example
To introduce the base terminology, I make use of an example of a satellite
orbiting around a planet. Although a simple simulation, it has consider-
able explanatory value. Following Woolfson and Pert [35, 17], consider an
orbiting satellite under tidal stress which stretches along the direction of
the radius vector. This model presupposes, in addition, that the orbit is
non-circular, and therefore, that the stress is variable making the satellite
expand and contract along the radius vector in a periodic fashion. Since
the satellite is not perfectly elastic, the mechanical energy is converted into
heat, which is radiated away. The overall effect is, however, that although
mechanical energy is lost, the system as a whole conserves angular momen-
tum. The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 2. The following
conditions and equations are included in the model:
For a planet of mass M and a satellite of mass m (M), in an
orbit of semi-major axis a and eccentricity e, the total energy is
E = −GMm
2a
(1)
and the angular momentum is
H = {GMa(1− e2)}m (2)
The model we shall use to simulate this situation is shown
in Figure 1. The planet is represented by a point, P , and the
satellite by a distribution of three masses, each m/3, at posi-
tions S1, S2 and S3, forming an equilateral triangle when free of
stress. The masses are connected, as shown, by springs, each
of unstressed length l and the same spring constant, k. Thus a
spring constantly stretched to a length l′ will exert an inward
force
F = k(l′ − l) (3)
9
Figure 1: The satellite is represented by three masses, each m/3, connected
by springs each of the same unstrained length, l [35, 19].
Now, we also introduce a dissipative element in our system
by making the force dependent on the rate of expansion or con-
traction of the spring, giving the following force law:
F = k(l′ − l)− cdl
′
dt
(4)
where the force acts inwards at the two ends. It is the second
term in Equation 4 which gives the simulation of the hysteresis
losses in the satellite [35, 18-19].
Thus understood, the mathematical model includes classical Newtonian
mechanics for describing all two-body systems under tidal stress, whether
these are satellites, planets, or some other body.
In order for this mathematical model to become a computer simulation,
it must first be transformed into a simulation model. As mentioned, such
transformations are done by using formal methods (e.g., some discretization
methods). For instance, equation 1 is described in the simulation model
by the subroutine TOTM = CM(1) + CM(2) + CM(3) + CM(4); EN =
−G ∗ TOTM/R + 0.5 ∗ V 2, whereas the force equations represented in (2)
and (3) are described by subroutine ACC in [36]. Besides these formal
transformations, non-formal techniques purposely modify the mathematical
model as well. As Figure 1 shows, the mass of the satellite is not longer
represented by one variable but rather three, each connected by springs of
certain length. This is a good example for the claim that a simulation model
retains parts of the structure of the mathematical model while it drops and
adds new structures.4
4In fact, a simulation model includes a host of non-mathematical structures, such as
10
Figure 2: The orbital eccentricity as a function of time [35, 20].
It is also important to notice that such simulation models represent a host
of real-world phenomena, and only by means of instantiating the set of initial
and boundary conditions can researchers single out one specific satellite,
orbiting around a specific planet, with a specific tidal stress, energy, and so
forth. For instance, Woolfson and Pert use the following set of parameter
values [35, 20]:
number of bodies = 4
mass of planet = 2 x 1027 kg
mass of satellite = 3 x 1022 kg
initial time step = 10 s
total simulation time = 125000 s
body chosen as origin = 1
tolerance = 100 m
initial distance of satellite = 1 x 108 m
unstretched length of spring = 1 x 106 m
initial eccentricity = 0.6
Thus instantiated, the computer simulation produces results that rep-
resent the behavior of a real satellite of a mass close to Triton, the largest
moon of Neptune, orbiting around a planet with a mass close to Jupiter’s.
Thus understood, this simulation has considerable explanatory value.
To see this, let me make the explanatory reasoning explicit. As an initial
loops, conditionals, subroutines, and other terminology that conceptually distance the
simulation models from mathematical models.
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condition, the position of the satellite is at its furthest distance from the
planet, hence the spikes only occur when they are at their closest. When
this happens, the satellite is stretched by the tidal force exerted by the
planet. Correspondingly, inertia makes the satellite tidal bulge lag behind
the radius vector. The lag and lead in the tidal bulge of the satellite give
spin angular momentum on approach, and subtract it on recession. When
receding from the near point, the tidal bulge is ahead of the radius vector
and the effect is therefore reversed. The spikes therefore occur because there
is an exchange between spin and orbital angular momentum around closest
approach [35, 21].
At this point, someone could bring forward Weirich’s and Krohs’ ex-
planatory relation, and claim that we could obtain an explanation of the
spikes by using the mathematical model. As discussed earlier, such an ob-
jection rests on the assumption that mathematical models are implemented
as a computer simulation simpliciter, taking the latter merely as an in-
strument of computation and ignoring the fact that the results have been
modified by the computation of the simulation model. As the example of
the simulation of a satellite shows, simulation models are conceptually and
epistemically different from mathematical models, and only the former can
be used to account for the explanation of the spikes.
This last point can be grounded on the fact that the results of the simula-
tion show the patterns described in the simulation model. Take for instance
the roundoff errors produced by the Runge-Kutta algorithm. Such errors are
partly responsible for the orbital eccentricity trending steadily downwards,
as shown in Figure 2. We would be unable to explain this effect with the
mathematical model alone, because it is the NBODY subroutine, responsi-
ble for implementing the Runge-Kutta method, that accounts for the orbital
eccentricity. In this respect, the mathematical model by itself has limited
explanatory force of the results of the simulation. This is the mistake that
Woolfson and Pert make when they try to explain the spikes, as their ex-
planation remains heavily dependent upon the mathematical machinery of
the model and cannot account for an orbital eccentricity trending down-
wards [35, 21]. These facts provide a justification for taking the simulation
model to be a complete representative of both the target system and the
computation that represents the target system, and therefore as the most
relevant unit with explanatory force. With these ideas in mind, let us now
turn to explaining why the spikes in the simulation occur by making use of
the simulation model.
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4 Explanation for computer simulations
Before discussing in detail the explanatory relation for computer simulations,
I would like to provide two reasons why I believe that the unificationist ac-
count provides a suitable explanatory framework for computer simulations.
First, the unificationist is a nomothetic theory of explanation, and as such
the relation between explanans and explanandum depends entirely on our
body of belief. Computer simulations are well suited for accommodation
within this framework, since they are designed and coded using our current
body of scientific knowledge. This contrasts with other theories of expla-
nation, particularly ontic theories, where the explanatory relation depends
on an objective external relation (i.e., causal relations [29] and some sort of
representation of causal relations [34]). This latter view is the one adopted
by Weirich and Krohs, who consider the mechanicist as the most suitable
framework for computer simulations. Admittedly, a discussion on this point
is still necessary but for my present purposes the unificationist provides the
right conceptual tools.
Second, unification consists of using the same patterns of derivation over
and over, reducing in this way a multiplicity of phenomena that we have to
accept as independent (i.e., phenomena for which we have no explanation,
but for which one is nonetheless anticipated [2]). This is a core idea in the
unificationist account that is also echoed by computer simulations. Com-
puter simulations can produce a multiplicity of results of different kinds
simply by setting their parameters to different values.5 Variables and sub-
routines can take different forms: a mass can be a charge and instead of the
force law the simulation could use the inverse-square law. This is something
that Woolfson and Pert make clear in their analysis of the simulation, as well
as in their code (see [36]). Moreover, the same computer simulation high-
lights different aspects of the same target system. For instance, we might
know why the satellite orbits around the planet, but have no idea why the
spikes occur. The point here is that the occurrence of one set of results has
no bearing on the likelihood that the next set of results will be known.
Producing a multiplicity of results is not an ad hoc characterization of
computer simulations, but rather an inherent feature of these methods. It
5This is not to say that computer simulations are unificatory systems. For such a
claim we also need to specify in what respects they unify. Rendering a host of simulated
phenomena – some of which are clearly unknown – is a core feature of computer simulations
that squares well with the unificationist. A future task is to show in what respects there
is unification in computer simulations, including models that are not straightforwardly
unificatory.
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is then desirable for a theory of explanation to be able to account for, and
capitalize on, these features. The unificationist is, in this respect, a suitable
theory of explanation for computer simulations.
4.1 The unificationist framework
Explanation, for the unificationist, begins with the set of accepted scien-
tific beliefs, K. In the sciences, K can be interpreted as classical mechanics
in physics, the evolutionary theory in biology, and the atomic theory in
chemistry. Finding the set K of accepted beliefs for computer simulations
is in no way different from other areas of science, as the simulation model
also relies on our current scientific knowledge. Examples from molecular
biology can be drawn, as we simulate the effects of alanine scanning and
ligand modifications based on molecular dynamics [5]. Simulations in nu-
clear physics would include the Boltzmann-Uehling-Uhlenbeck model, some
theorems from statistical mechanics such as Liouville’s theorem, and general
Hamiltonian equations of classical mechanics [15]. And, of course, Woolfson
and Pert’s example relies on a set of differential equations as described by
classical mechanics.
The real challenge for the unificationist is to specify what counts as the
explanatory store over K, E(K). This is, what is the set of acceptable ar-
gument patterns that have explanatory force. According to Kitcher, E(K)
encompass three main elements, namely, the schematic sentences (i.e., ex-
pressions obtained by replacing some of the non-logical expressions in a
sentence by dummy letters), a set of filling instructions (i.e., the set of di-
rections for replacing those dummy letters), and a classification (i.e., the
set of sentences that provide directions for which terms are to be regarded
as premises, what is inferred from what, and so forth). The general ar-
gument pattern (or argument pattern for short) is “a triple consisting of a
schematic argument, a set of sets of filling instructions, one for each term
of the schematic argument, and a classification for the schematic argument”
[19, 432]. Additionally, there is the comments section, that Kitcher uses for
supplying additional information, such as minor details on the limits of an
argument pattern, and possible corrections for it. To explain, then, consists
of deriving descriptions of a multiplicity of phenomena using as few and as
stringent argument patterns as possible.
In the context of computer simulations, the explanatory store is con-
strued in similar ways. The schematic sentences constitute expressions in
the language of the simulation model. For instance, the schematic sentence
would specify the subroutines NBODY, STORE, and ACC, variables like
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the mass of the different objects involved in the simulation, and diverse con-
trol flow statement (such as loops, conditionals, and the like). The filling
instructions makes use of the initial and boundary conditions set out earlier.
As for the classification, I take it to be just what Kitcher intended it to be,
that is, the set of sentences that provide directions for which terms are to
be regarded as premises, what is inferred from what, and so forth. Finally,
the comments section plays a more visible role than originally ascribed by
Kitcher, since it works as a repository for all the remaining information that
have explanatory force, but that cannot be constructed as a schematic sen-
tence. As I discuss in the next section an example of this is, again, the
roundoff error responsible for the spikes steady trending downwards.
4.2 Example of an explanation
Allow me now to reconstruct the explanatory store for the simulation of an
orbiting satellite under tidal stress. Following the unificationist, a possible
explanatory schemata for explaining the spikes shown on Figure 2 are:6
Schematic Sentences:7
1. There are two objects, I and J , one of mass CM(I) and
another with a mass of CM(J) ( CM(I))
2. There is an orbit of semi-major axis A and eccentricity E
3. The object of mass J is distributed into three masses, each
J/3, at positions POS(1), POS(2) and POS(3), forming
an equilateral triangle free of stress.
4. The relative velocities of the bodies are V EL(1), V EL(2),
and V EL(3)
5. . . .
6. Subroutine NBODY includes the Runge-Kutta subroutine
with automatic step control.
7. Subroutine STORE stores intermediate coordinates and ve-
locity components as the computation progresses.
6A reconstruction of computer simulations as arguments is given by [4]. Unlike him,
I am not claiming that all computer simulations are arguments, but rather that some
aspects of the simulation model can be reconstructed for explanatory purposes.
7A full description of the variables, data types, and subroutines can be found in [36].
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(a) For each position {POS(1, 2, 3)} of the satellite, the
expected orbital distance is given by equation:
R = SQRT (POS(1)∗∗2+POS(2)∗∗2+POS(3)∗∗2)
(b) For the mass of the satellite {C(1, 2, 3)}, and mass of
the planet C(4), the expected intrinsic energy is given
by the equation:
Velocity V (2) obtained from the square of relative ve-
locities of the bodies,
TOTM = CM(1) + CM(2) + CM(3) + CM(4), and
EN = −G ∗ TOTM/R + 0.5 ∗ V 2
(c) For each position {POS(1, 2, 3)} and velocities {VEL(1,
2, 3)} of the satellite, the expected intrinsic angular
momentum is given by:
D1 = POS(2) ∗ V EL(3)− POS(3) ∗ V EL(2),
D2 = POS(3) ∗ V EL(1)− POS(1) ∗ V EL(3),
D3 = POS(1) ∗ V EL(2)− POS(2) ∗ V EL(1), and
H2 = D1 ∗ ∗2 + D2 ∗ ∗2 + D3 ∗ ∗2
(d) . . .
8. Subroutine ACC calculates the acceleration of each body
due to its interactions with all other bodies
(a) For each I = 2..NB − 1, NB being the number of
bodies, and for each J = I + 1..NB, and for each
K = 1..3, equation DIF (K) = XT (I,K) −XT (J,K)
calculates the spring and relative forces, while the ex-
pected length of spring is given by the equation ELP =
SQRT (DIF (1) ∗ ∗2 + DIF (2) ∗ ∗2 + DIF (3) ∗ ∗2)
(b) For each I = 1..NB−1, L = J + 1..NB, and K = 1..3,
the interactions for all pairs of bodies is given by (only
the gravitational force is considered here): R(K) =
XT (J,K)−XT (L,K) and RRR = (R(1) ∗ ∗2 +R(2) ∗
∗2 + R(3) ∗ ∗2) ∗ ∗1.5
(c) . . .
E The spikes formed are due to an exchange between spin
and orbital angular momentum around closest approach.
Filling Instructions:
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The gravitational constant is set to G = 6.667E − 11. The mass
CM(I) and the mass CM(J) will be replaced by a planet’s and
a satellite’s respectively. A dissipative element is introduced into
the structure by making the force dependent on the rate of ex-
pansion or contraction of the spring, giving a force law, where the
force acts inwards at the two ends. Values for POS(1), POS(2),
POS(3), V EL(1) and V EL(2) must also be given. Recall from
earlier the parameter values set.
Classification:
The classification of the argument indicates that 1-5 are premises,
that 6, 7, and 8 are subroutines containing equations which can
be obtained by substituting identicals. The explanandum E fol-
lows from 6, 7, and 8 by derivation.
Comments:
1. Normal SI Units are used.
2. By changing the subroutines different problems may be
solved. The CM’s can be masses or charges or be made
equal to unity while the force law can be inverse-square or
anything else (e.g., Lennard-Jones).
3. The four-step Runge-Kutta algorithm is used. The results
of two STEPS with TIMESTEP H are checked against tak-
ing one STEP with TIMESTEP 2 ∗H. If the difference is
within the TOLERANCE, then the two STEPS, each of
H, are accepted and the STEPLENGTH is doubled for the
next STEP. However, if the TOLERANCE is not satisfied,
then the STEP is not accepted and one tries again with a
halved STEPLENGTH. It is advisable, but not essential,
to start with a reasonable STEPLENGTH; the program
quickly finds a suitable value.
4. The user is required to specify a TOLERANCE, the maxi-
mum absolute error that can be tolerated in any positional
coordinate. If this is set too low, the program can become
very slow.
5. Three kinds of forces are operating (subroutine ACC): the
normal gravitational inverse-square law between all pairs of
bodies, a second force due to the elasticity of the material
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as modeled by the set of three springs, and a third force op-
erating between the three component bodies of the satellite
and which depends on the rate at which the springs expand
or contract. The third force provides the dissipation in the
system.
6. Subroutine NBODY includes the Runge-Kutta subroutine
with automatic step control, with a local discretization error
on the order of O(hp +1), and a total accumulated error on
the order of nChp+1 = C(x¯− x0)hp. The method also has
a roundoff error on the order of O(h2) [1, 67].
Thus understood, the spikes of Figure 2 are explained as an exchange
between spin and orbital angular momentum around closest approach. The
explanation is obtained by derivation from the schematic sentences 1-8, as
set forth in the filling instructions and the classification.
The comments section, on the other hand, is a repository of information
that can be later used for explanatory purposes. As such, it plays two
central roles. First, it documents boundaries and alternative explanations
for the argument pattern (along with the limits and possible corrections).
For instance, comment 2 indicates that the same explanatory schemata could
be used for explaining masses as well as charges. This section also establishes
standards and limitations. For instance, it is recommended to start with a
reasonable STEPLENGTH, otherwise it could take longer to find suitable
values for the Runge-Kutta algorithm. Similarly, an acceptable value for
TOLERANCE is around 100 m.
Second, and more actively, it includes information about the results with
relevant explanatory force, which could not be included as a schematic sen-
tence. Reasons for this vary from formulations that play no role in the
computing process (e.g., preconditions and postconditions), but that are es-
sential in the assessment of the correctness of subroutines, to quantifications
that are intrinsically difficult to reconstruct. For instance, the Runge-Kutta
subroutine has a local discretization error function of the order O(hp + 1),
and a total accumulated error on the order of nChp+1 = C(x¯ − x0)hp .
Both are iterative functions, therefore the derivation of the local and total
error depends on each iteration. Thus described, the local and total errors
cannot be derived in the unificationist’s preferred way, although both carry
significant explanatory force. This situation allows us to expand the argu-
ment pattern and vouch for the comment section as a repository of relevant
information for the explanation.
In some simulations, it is possible to actually measure some of the errors
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with certain accuracy. To illustrate this point, suppose that the orbital
eccentricity shown in Figure 2 is because of a small roundoff error such
that, for each loop in the computation, a difference of 1−1000 kilometers
is introduced for each revolution with respect to the real value. Although
very small, this roundoff error plays a crucial role in the overall eccentricity
trending steadily downwards. In particular, given a sufficiently large number
of loops, such an error is responsible for the satellite reaching an eccentricity
equal to 0 (i.e., after a determined number of runs, the satellite reaches a
circular orbit).
In such a case, the errors are measured and reconstructed in terms of
schematic sentences, allowing the derivation of the explanandum in the usual
way. A possible reconstruction looks like the following:
Schematic sentence: 8’) There is a discretization error of ap-
prox. 1−1000 in the total simulation time.
Reconstructing errors in this way is obviously the best option, as it al-
lows the derivation of the explanandum. Unfortunately, measuring errors
is not always an easy enterprise. For cases where errors are unmeasurable,
like in the case of the Runge-Kutta above, I suggest to include them in
the comments section as further non-derivable reliable information with ex-
planatory force. This move is perfectly acceptable within the unificationist
framework, since non-derivable but explanatory information can be included
in the comments section (Kitcher himself makes use of this resouce in sec-
tion 4.6 [19]). This is obviously not an ideal situation, as it restricts the
explanatory force of the simulation. However, knowing about the presence
of errors makes the epistemic difference between being aware of the existence
of a disturbing factor, and thus being able to interpret and to explain the
results of the simulation in light of those errors, and being unable to account
for unexpected results.
4.3 Understanding
Thus far, my efforts have been directed towards showing the structure of
the explanatory relation for computer simulations. This is the core issue
behind a logic of scientific explanation for computer simulations and the
main outcome of this article. Having said that, the logic of scientific expla-
nation also has the larger aim of showing the epistemic gain of explaining.
In the following, I give sense to the idea of understanding in the context of
explanation for computer simulations.
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To the unificationist, understanding comes from seeing connections and
common patterns in what initially appeared to be brute or independent
facts.8 ‘Seeing’ here is taken as the cognitive maneuver of reducing the
explanandum to a greater theoretical framework, such as our corpus of sci-
entific beliefs. Schurz and Lambert take that, “to understand a phenomenon
P is to know how P fits into one’s background knowledge” [30, 66]. And
Elgin asserts that “understanding is primarily a cognitive relation to a fairly
comprehensive, coherent body of information” [11, 35].9 Thus understood,
such a theoretical reduction comes with several epistemological advantages.
The explanandum becomes more transparent to us, we obtain a more uni-
fied picture of nature, we strengthen and systematize our corpus of scientific
beliefs, and overall the world becomes a more simplified place (see [13],
[18, 19]).
When results of a computer simulation are understood, a similar cogni-
tive maneuver is performed: researchers are able to incorporate the results
into a larger theoretical framework, reducing in this way the number of in-
dependent results seeking an explanation. Let us note that, for the case of
computer simulations, such incorporation of the results is carried out in two
steps: first, the results are included into the body of scientific beliefs related
to the simulation model; and second, to include them into our greater body
of scientific beliefs. By doing things in this way, we are fully within the
unificationist framework.
Let us illustrate this last point with the example of the results of simu-
lating a satellite orbiting around a planet from section 3. By explaining why
the spikes occur (i.e., the results of the simulation shown in Figure 2), we
give reasons for their formation. Such explanation is possible, as discussed
earlier, because there is a well-defined pattern structure that enables us to
derive a description of the spikes from the simulation model. Understanding
these results, then, comes from incorporating them into the larger corpus
of scientific beliefs that is the simulation model. That is, researchers grasp
how the results fit into, contributes to, and are justified by reference to the
theoretical framework postulated by the simulation model. This is precisely
8For an analysis of ‘brute’ and ‘independent’ facts, see [2] and [12]
9[3] has rightly criticized theories of scientific explanation for failing to provide a full
fledged account of what understanding consists in, and of how it is produced by scientific
explanations. Here, I am only concerned with showing how understanding of results of
computer simulations is realized within the unificationist account. It is therefore not
within my interests to fully flesh out how such understanding is carried out. To this end,
however, the ‘contextual approach to scientific understanding’ as elaborated by [7], and
the recent work on ‘how-possible’ and ‘how-actually’ understanding by [28] could shed
some light on the issue.
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the reason why we are able to explain the occurrence of the spikes as well
as their downwards trend: both can be theoretically reduced by the sim-
ulation model. Furthermore, since the simulation model is dependent on
well-established scientific knowledge – in this case Newtonian mechanics –
we are able to see the results of the simulation in a way that is now familiar
to us, that is, unified with our general body of established scientific beliefs
about two-body mechanics.
Thus far the standard image of the unificationist applies to computer
simulations. But I believe that we can extend this image by showing how
understanding results also encompass a practical dimension. From the per-
spective of simulation research, understanding results also involves grasping
the technical difficulties behind coding more complex, faster, and more real-
istic simulations, interpreting verification and validation processes, and con-
veying information relevant for the internal mechanism of the simulation.
In other words, understanding results also feeds back into the simulation
model, helping to improve our computer simulations. For instance, by ex-
plaining and understanding the reasons why the spikes trend downwards,
researchers are aware of the existence of and have the means to solve round-
off errors, discretization error, grid resolution, etc. In computer simulation
studies, researchers want to explain because they also want to understand
and improve their simulations.
My last point is related to understanding real-world phenomena. As
we discussed at the beginning, Weirich and Krohs had as their chief pur-
pose the explanation of real-world phenomena. Both authors are right in
thinking that the use of computer simulations is justified, in a large num-
ber of cases, because they provide understanding of certain aspects of the
world. The question now is, then, can we understand real-word phenomena
by explaining results of computer simulations?
I believe that we can answer these questions positively. We know that the
visualization of the results of the simulation show two facets: first the spikes,
which represent the behavior of a real-world satellite under tidal stress, and
second their trend steadily downwards, which stands for a roundoff error
coded in the simulation model. This means that the results of the simulation
related to the spikes represent, and thus can be ascribed to, the behavior of a
real-world satellite. In this sense, and following Elgin on this point [11, 10],
there is an entitlement – via representation and ascription – of the results of
the simulation to the behavior of a real-world satellite. It is precisely because
of this entitlement that we are able to relate our understanding of the results
of the simulation with our understanding of the behavior of the real-world
satellite. This point can also be made by means of the practical ability
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that presupposes understanding something. As Elgin cogently argues, the
understander holds the ability to make use of the information at her disposal
for practical purposes [11, 35]. In our case, researchers could actually build
the satellite specified in the simulation.
On the other hand, the explanation of the spikes trending steadily down-
wards is carried out by factoring the roundoff errors in the explanatory store,
as discussed in section 4.2. Once derived, it becomes very clear why the re-
sults show spikes trending downwards, giving researchers a good idea of how
to fix them. Now, since the trend does not represent and thus cannot be
ascribed to an empirical counterpart, there is no entitlement. In this sense,
our understanding remains confined to this facet of the results, and thus
prevents us from wrongly claiming explanation of a circular orbit of the
real-satellite.
To contrast this last point, let us refer to Krohs once more. When he
faces the question about computer simulations without a correlate in the
real world, his only way out is to claim that simulations are of fictitious or
imagined dynamic material system [20, 285]. Krohs then adds the burden of
having to account for this fictional relationship, the way we explain it, and
the way we understand it. Under my account, we do not need this fiction,
but rather we can explain and understand results of computer simulations
in their own right.
5 Conclusions
This article presents and discusses a new approach to the logic of scientific
explanation for computer simulations. I proposed to answer two questions,
namely, ‘what is the explanatory relation for computer simulations?’ and
‘what kind of epistemic gain should we expect?’ The first question was
discussed in section 4 and the following subsections. The second question
was answered in section 4.3. In order to address either question, it was first
necessary to give reasons for taking the explanans as the simulation model
and the explanandum as the results of the computer simulation. Reasons
for this were given in section 2.
The example of the simulation of the satellite used in section 3 gave us an
intelligible reconstruction of a standard computer simulation, and therefore
did not require us recreate it in full length. One possible reconstruction
for explanatory purposes is shown in section 4.2, but others could follow.
For instance, simpler schematic sentences could be derived directly from the
subroutines (i.e., NBODY, STORE, and ACC) provided that we know the
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input variables and the return value. Alternatively, we could rewrite some of
the subroutines as more comprehensive schematic sentences. For instance,
the subroutine that calculates the square of intrinsic angular momentum
could be rewritten as: SqIAM(P1, P2, P3, V 1, V 2, V 3) : D1, D2, where
{P1, P2, P3, V1, V2, V3} are the input variables and D1 and D2 are the
return values.
Additionally, more complex computational structures (e.g., libraries,
data-bases, multi-scale computing, pseudorandom number generators for
heuristic simulations, etc.) could be approached in a similar fashion, as long
as the documentation is sufficiently informative of their functionality. In this
sense, and regardless of how the computational structure is programmed, we
can always know how it works, what sort of input variables are taken, and
what values are returned – or should be returned. This moves the level of
interpretation of the simulation model one step up, and solves the problem
of limitations in reconstructing the simulation model as schematic sentences
due to their complexity.
If the above considerations are correct, then my account accommodates
explanation for computer simulations in a way that has no precedent in the
literature. It then comes naturally that genuine philosophical issues would
emerge which have not been addressed here. If this is the case, then more
discussion on the topic should be expected.
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